I listed the core topics of this blog in yesterday’s post, but there’s one topic that I need to get in front of you pretty fast. It deserves attention early in this blog’s life, and that’s because some of you will have a good chunk of your MP3s obtained from sources that could be - ahem - less than legitimate (not you specifically, of course - I’m referring to other readers). And, I assume, you want to keep them away from the prying eyes of the authorities.

What do you do when there’s a knock at the door at 3am? And the authorities, god bless ‘em, want to take your PC for ‘analysis’?

Plausible Deniability

Google the phrase ‘plausible deniability’. I am not a lawyer (IANAL), but to my layman’s mind it means that I can assert that something ain’t so. And anyone pulling my PC apart, bit by bit, will have a hard time proving me wrong.

It’s like a hypothesis, if you’ve studied research at college or uni. The authorities hypothesize there’s illegal content on your PC. You tell them no. They have to prove their hypothesis is true, otherwise they must accept their hypothesis is wrong (or at best unproven).

Introducing Truecrypt

There’s a neat piece of free software called Truecrypt. When I dicovered it, it blew the ole’ socks off. Right into the next zipcode.

Here’s the link (this is freeware, so no affiliate link):

Truecrypt Disk Encryption Software (non-aff link)

Truecrypt lets you set up an encrypted volume on your PC hard disk. The volumes it creates are indistinguishable from random data on your disk, yet with the appropriate key will open themselves up and reveal all their ill-gotten contents.

But you need the key. Theoretically you could crack the key, but that would take some effort spread over a gazillion years or so.

The authorities could also put you in front of the magistrate, who would demand you reveal the key.

It’s against the law to diss the judge, right? So you give them the key.

But here’s the fun bit. Truecrypt allows encrypted volumes within encrypted volumes, so the key you give them unlocks the first layer. This holds a small quantity of ripped MP3s you already legally own, or material that’s so banal you wouldn’t bother downloading it anyway. Like Britney, or the Pet Shop Boys (shudders hard, spills beer).

The real stuff is encrypted at the next level, and there’s no damn way they can prove it even exists.

Gets even better.

(Almost) Zero Footprint

The Truecrypt software can be installed on a flash drive. Admittedly there’s a bit of extra tomfoolery involved to initially mount the encrypted drive, but the benefit is there’s almost a zero footprint.

Once the drive is mounted at boot time, you take the flash drive out and stick it in your pocket. Because there’s no Trucrypt footprint on your hard drive, noone can say for sure what’s there. In fact, the drive just looks like it’s random bits.

That’s the way you run it. Your PC’s data volume, or your network attached storage, is encrypted to two levels using Truecrypt. While it’s powered up you have access to everything there. Power it down, and it looks empty until you mount it with your pocketed flash drive.

Here’s the Gotcha

The whole system depends on a minimal footprint being left by Truecrypt. Just by itself, Truecrypt does this pretty well. It’s not perfect - someone could see evidence of Truecrypt activity in the Windows registry, but they can’t tell what it was or how it was used.

Here’s the issue. If you use a Media Player that relies on a database of some sort, you’re (potentially) exposed.

The player database holds all details of your media library - even when the source files aren’t available. So if you use Microsoft’s various media products (Media Player, Media Centre, Vista Home Premium), Apple iTunes, or many other database-dependent media players - you’ve unwittingly created a footprint beyond Truecrypt’s ability to control.

How do you protect yourself? The obvious answer, and the only correct one, is you don’t use a database-dependent media player. Ever.

Sounds like a subject for a future post?